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TEAM AGENCY AND CONDITIONAL GAMES 
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University of Cape Town 





We consider motivations for acknowledging that people participate in multiple levels 
of economic agency. One of these levels is characterized in terms of subjective utility 
to the individual; another, frequently observed, level is characterized in terms of 
utility to social groups with which people (temporarily) identify. Following 
Bacharach (2006), we describe such groups as ‘teams’. We review Bacharach’s 
theory of such identification in his account of ‘team reasoning’. While this 
conceptualization is useful, it applies only to processes supported by deliberation. As 
this is only one of a range of causal mechanisms underlying behaviour by humans and 
other strategic agents, a more general account is desirable. We then argue that 
Stirling’s (2012) account of ‘conditional games’ achieves the desired generalization. 
 





All of economics is concerned with how some agent could do something better or 
best, in response to choices of other agents, resource constraints, and incentives 
defined as such by reference to the agent’s goals. It is appropriate to refer to ‘agents’ 
rather than to ‘people’, because in many economic models the agents are firms, or 
households, or governments, or teams. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of 
economic applications concern aggregated responses (Ross 2014, Chapter 5). 
Notwithstanding this fact, economics is frequently associated, both by its critics and 
by many of its leading practitioners and textbook authors, with individualism, the 
view that individual people are in some sense the fundamental sites of agency on 
which others are dependent. 
 
Economists typically do not give individualism an ontological interpretation, that is, 
as reflecting a metaphysical doctrine to the effect that all properties of non-individual 
agents must decompose into, or be functions of, individual human (or other animal) 
agents. Even if some economists, when they dabble in philosophy, adhere to such 
social atomism, ‘official’ individualism is usually held to be ‘methodological’, and 
might be expressed as the following constraint on economic model building: a sound 
economic model should not require any individual human agent to choose an action 
that is sub-optimal for her, given the choices of the other agents, without some (good) 




Stated this way, methodological individualism as expressed in game-theoretic 
applications is the assumption that the solutions of all models involving individual 
human agents, either explicitly or implicitly, should be compatible with a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium of a game, that also models the interaction1, and in 
which the individual people in question are the players. Binmore (1994) provides an 
explicit defense of this methodological principle.  
 
Following Ross (2014), we distinguish two variants of substantive (i.e., not merely 
methodological) individualism. Normative individualism refers to the Enlightenment 
conviction that individuals, not groups, are the centres of human dignity and valuation 
that most deserve valorisation. In modern democracies this is a premise that liberals 
and conservatives generally share. It is typically assumed in welfare economics. 
Descriptive individualism, by contrast, refers to the view that people acquire their 
preferences asocially. Descriptive individualism is, in general, false: most human 
preferences, and almost all of the most important ones, are copied from other people 
or shaped under their guidance and tutelage. Individual human distinctiveness merits 
valorisation because its cultivation and maintenance is an achievement for members 
of a social species given to high levels of suggestiveness and conformity. Thus, far 
from being in tension with one another, normative individualism and descriptive anti-
individualism make a naturally complementary pair. 
 
The fact that people tend naturally to identify with social groups to which they 
belong, but simultaneously strive to operate and optimise individual utility functions, 
is a phenomenon that a fully adequate economic modeling apparatus should be able to 
represent. This is one of the aims of the team reasoning idea promoted by Martin 
Hollis (1998), Robert Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003) and Michael Bacharach (1999, 
2006). In Bacharch’s (2006) unfinished2 treatise Beyond Individual Choice: Teams 
and Frames in Game Theory, he and his scholarly executors emphasize that most 
people are experienced in executing gestalt switches between individual and group 
agency, sometimes choosing in such a way as to maximise an individual utility 
function and sometimes choosing in such a way as to maximise the utility of a team 
with which they identify. Furthermore, people are often aware of this gestalt duality 
and can and do compare and weigh the alternatives suggested by each gestalt in 
specific circumstances. 
 
Ross (2014) argues that this phenomenon is better characterised as team agency rather 
than team reasoning, because like most economic responses it only sometimes 
involves deliberate reflection. This is not to say that when people reflexively optimise 
the utility of a group rather than themselves this doesn’t amount to a choice. There is 
generally some hypothetical incentive that could move a person to try, in a specific 
interaction, exclusively to optimise her self-interest. The point, then, is that some 
                                                
1 We assume that because no model ever completely describes an economic interaction or situation, 
interactions and situations can have multiple models that should be compatible with one another where 
their applications overlap. In the kind of example emphasised by Binmore (1994), bargaining scenarios 
are modeled as both cooperative and non-cooperative games for different purposes; but the cooperative 
solution must correspond to one of the Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative model. 
2 Bacharach was approximately halfway through composing the manuscript when he passed away 
unexpectedly in 2002. Sugden and Natalie Gold, one of Bacharach’s PhD students at the time, edited 
his work and wrote introductory and concluding chapters so that it could be published post mortem. 
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chosen identifications do not result from reasoning, even though by definition all 
choice is motivated. But Bacharach (2006) and his executors use the phrase ‘team 
reasoning’ because they link the modeling problem to the rational solution of 
equilibrium selection problems in game theory. 
 
In the chapter to follow, we will first summarise the team reasoning idea as Bacharach 
(2006) conceives it. However, we will then show that the effect of team reasoning on 
equilibrium selection in games is generalised, both conceptually and technically, by 
Wynn Stirling’s (2012) modeling framework for conditional games. As with other 
games, conditional games might or might not be explicitly represented by their 
players; sometimes they might be selected and stabilised by processes of biological, 
but in humans more typically social and institutional, evolution. If Stirling generalises 
Bacharach where game theoretic representation is concerned, this can be seen as 
supporting Ross’s (2014) suggestion that team reasoning is at best one special 
mechanism that supports team agency. If team reasoning sometimes goes on, 
discovery of the mechanisms that implement it falls within the domain of psychology 
rather than economics. What economists need to be able to model is team agency; and 
thanks to Stirling they now can. 
 
2. Equilibium selection and team reasoning 
 
Equilibrium selection problems in game theory arise from the fact that many games 
have multiple Nash equilibria (NE), but often some NE seem more ‘sensible’ and 
people in fact converge on them, even though the formal theory of choice that is built 
into game theory3 includes no axioms or principles that recommend it. This property 
of NE, taken as a problem, motivated the refinement literature of the 1970s and 1980s 
(Kreps 1990), which sought to add restrictive axioms to solution concepts and thereby 
rule out ‘inferior’ NE as solutions.  This approach threatened to degenerate into a 
programme for rationalising every distinct situation as a sui generis game, thus 
eviscerating the explanatory and predictive power of NE, and so was largely 
abandoned in the 1990s in favour of evolutionary and behavioural approaches to 
equilibrium selection. Behavioural models tend to restrict solutions by motivating 
bounds on people’s rationality, whereas evolutionary models hardwire agents with 
strategies and rely on evolutionary dynamics to provide estimates of the likelihoods 
with which various equilibria will be played in a particular population. 
 
In contrast to these approaches, Bacharach (2006) argues that when ‘fully rational’ 
individual people reason as members of teams, some equilibrium selection problems 
dissolve. He focuses on three types of game to illustrate and defend his general 
proposal. 
 
The first type is the pure coordination game, for which the strategic form is presented 
in Table I. Players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose “Heads” or “Tails.” If the labels 
match (i.e., Heads and Heads or Tails and Tails) the players each receive their 
highest-valued outcome. If the labels do not match, each player receives an outcome 
with lower utility. The game has two pure strategy NE, (Heads, Heads) and (Tails, 
Tails). In experiments literally involving coins, people tend to converge on (Heads, 
                                                
3 See Binmore (2009). 
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Heads) (Mehta et al, 1994). This suggests that (Heads, Heads) tends to be salient in 
the sense of Schelling (1960). Salience, famously, operates exogenously and is not 
captured by NE as a technical solution concept. 
 
  Player 2 
  Heads Tails 
Player 1 Heads 1, 1 0, 0 Tails 0, 0 1, 1 
Table I 
 
The second game Bacharach considers is the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), as shown in 
strategic form in Table II. The PD’s unique NE is (Defect, Defect), but the outcome 
when both players adopt their dominant strategies, (2, 2), is worse for both players 
than what they each would have obtained, (3, 3), had they adopted their dominated 
strategies instead. 
 
  Player 2 
  Cooperate Defect 
Player 1 Cooperate 3, 3 1, 4 Defect 4, 1 2, 2 
Table II 
 
Bacharach argues that the one-shot PD presents a problem for applied game theory 
because in experiments many pairs of human players arrive at the Pareto superior 
outcome.  
 
Bacharach argues that the third game he considers, the Hi-Lo game of Table III, 
provides the most representative frame for understanding the general class of 
equilibrium selection puzzles for which pure coordination and PD games furnish 
special cases. Hi-Lo has two pure strategy NE, (High, High) and (Low, Low), where 
the former Pareto dominates the latter. 
 
  Player 2 
  High Low 
Player 1 High 2, 2 0, 0 Low 0, 0 1, 1 
Table III 
 
Hi-Lo raises the same kind of equilibrium selection problem, according to Bacharach, 
as a pure coordination game because NE as a solution concept does not prescribe play 
of one pair of equilibrium strategies over the other. But the indeterminacy in Hi-Lo 
seems particularly troubling because in actual applications people have no problem at 
all in coordinating on the (High, High) equilibrium. 
 
If we are willing to incorporate bounds on people’s rationality then it is easy to 
explain the selection of (High, High): if each player assumes that the other assigns 
equal probability to both strategies then High is a mutual best response. But given the 
simplicity of the game this approach is unconvincing. If a style of unbounded 
reasoning that would prescribe the choice of High in this game can be identified, then 
Bacharach argues that it might also account for the solution principles apparently used 
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by many or most human players of pure coordination games and one-shot PDs. 
Bacharach’s (2006) theory of team reasoning is intended to identify such a general 
solution. 
 
In motivating his proposal, Bacharach also directs attention to non-toy examples such 
as the “offside trap” in football (soccer) where defenders simultaneously run forward 
so that the other team is caught offside when it tries to attack the goal. Each defender 
has two strategies: she can try to steal the ball from the attackers and block the goal, 
or she can rush forward. If all defenders choose the second strategy, they might catch 
the attackers offside. The first strategy, Bacharach argues, is akin to playing Low in 
Hi-Lo while the latter is equivalent to playing High, because when everyone adopts 
the offside trap defence, the likelihood of success is greater. Such play is routinely 
observed in experienced teams. Can game theory be used to play any role in 
explaining this achievement?  
 
Team reasoning, according to Bacharach, provides the answer. Players using such 
reasoning find the strategy profile that yields the highest possible payoff for the team, 
and then the players adopt the strategies which, in combination, produce the profile.  
 
To develop the idea, we begin with what Bacharch refers as a simple coordination 
context. Assume that there is a set T of n agents, with a set of feasible profiles of 
options O, and a shared ranking of these profiles as embodied in the payoff function 
U4. Thus, a simple coordination context is the triple (T, O, U). Bacharach argues that 
many non-toy situations have the properties of a simple coordination context, and 
directs attention to hypothesised causal processes or choice mechanisms which 
determine the actions of agents in these contexts. One such choice mechanism, which 
Bacharach calls simple direction, has the following features. Let o* be the profile o 
that yields the highest value of U. Under simple direction, we assume that a (n + 1)st 
agent, the director, works out o*, identifies the agents in control of the constituent 
components of o*, tells each agent i to execute her component oi*, and the agents then 
perform the directed actions. If all the members of T are influenced by simple 
direction then o* is implemented and U is maximised. 
 
Team reasoning, Bacharach (2006, p. 123) argues, is “do-it-yourself direction.” 
Agents in a simple coordination context team reason about choice problems as 
follows: each computes the optimal profile o*; each identifies their component oi*; 
and each reasons that she should perform oi* because that is the component of the 
optimal profile over which she has control. Clearly if everyone in T team reasons then 
the optimal profile o* is implemented and team welfare, as embodied in U, is 
maximised. 
 
Team reasoning is thus a two-step process. The first step involves reasoning at the 
group level so as to identify the optimal profile o*. The second step involves 
reasoning at the individual level so as to select and implement oi*, the individual’s 
component of the optimal profile o*. When the agents in T execute the profile o*, 
                                                
4 Following Bacharach, we use U to refer to the shared or group payoff function and ui to refer to an 
individual payoff function. 
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Bacharach refers to the mechanism by which they do so as a team mechanism and the 
members of T as a team.  
 
If we apply the logic of team reasoning to Hi-Lo we see that the equilibrium selection 
problem dissolves. If the players of Hi-Lo team reason, they will identify (High, 
High) as the optimal profile (step one) and they will then each execute High, as this is 
each player’s action from the optimal profile under her control (step two). 
 
What should we expect when T includes team reasoners and non-team reasoners? And 
what happens when one cannot determine with certainty who is a team reasoner and 
who is not a team reasoner? These cases lead Bacharach to the notions of a restricted 
coordination context and unreliable coordination context, respectively. 
 
A restricted coordination context occurs when there is common knowledge among the 
agents as to who team reasons and who does not team reason in a particular group. 
The latter agents are referred to as the remainder and they are assumed to adopt a 
fixed sub-profile f of actions, which is known to the team reasoners. The team 
reasoners in the group apply restricted team reasoning, the goal of which is to 
maximise U subject to the constraint that the non-team reasoners will adopt f. A 
restricted coordination context is arguably more realistic than a simple coordination 
context, but a generalisation of both of these interactions is an unreliable coordination 
context. 
 
The scope of a restricted coordination context is limited by two assumptions. The first 
is that there is common knowledge concerning those agents who comprise the 
remainder. In most coordination contexts there is likely to be uncertainty about who 
team reasons and who does not. The second assumption is that the agents in the 
remainder adopt a fixed sub-profile f. It may be the case, however, that members of 
the remainder have strategic inclinations of their own which produces a 
noncooperative game between the team reasoners and the remainder. Bacharach refers 
to this case as the strategic remainder problem; it is discussed in detail in Bacharach 
(1999). We will focus on the limitations engendered by the first assumption, which 
Bacharach terms the unknown remainder problem. 
 
Assume that membership of the remainder is determined by a random process. That 
is, let M be a mechanism governing team choice, and assume that every agent 
functions under M with probability ω, which is common knowledge among the group. 
Assume further that if agent i turns out to be in the remainder, she adopts option fi, 
where fi is referred to as her default choice. We can describe this unreliable 
coordination context by the collection (S, ω, O, U, f), where S represents the set of n 
agents, ω is the probability of functioning under M, O is the set of feasible profiles of 
options, U is the shared payoff function, and f is the profile of default options. T now 
represents the subset of agents from S that function under M, and R = S – T denotes 
the remainder.  
 
In an unreliable coordination context the crucial issue is how a team defines an 
optimal profile given the probability ω of functioning under M. The first-best profile 
o* is unlikely to be attained because that is only possible when all agents function 
under M. The optimal profile in this context will be the one which maximises the 
expected value of U and thereby takes into account the probabilities of functioning 
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and failing under M. This particular profile is labelled o** and it is to be understood 
as the profile that maximises the expected value of U given that each agent i will 
choose oi with probability ω and fi with probability 1 – ω.  
 
In an unreliable coordination context, the interpretation of a team mechanism is one 
where the agents adopt oi** if they function under the mechanism, such that the 
mechanism delivers the profile o**. A team is therefore defined as those agents in S 
who function under the mechanism M, which implies that T is a random set of agents. 
The definition of team reasoning in this context follows naturally from the definition 
given earlier: each agent i in T (i.e., an agent that functions under M) determines o**, 
and then identifies and implements oi**. Bacharach refers to team reasoning in this 
unreliable coordination context as circumspect team reasoning. This mode of 
reasoning is efficient, in the sense of maximising the expected value of U, even when 
there is uncertainty about which agents will function and fail under the mechanism. 
 
A reader who finds this framework for analysis useful is bound to wonder what 
conditions, in general, tend to generate team reasoning. Bacharach argues that group 
identification primes team reasoning and he refers to this as the reasoning effect of 
group identification. 
 
This brings us squarely to the question of how we identify human game players with 
(economic) agents. When we attribute agency to an individual person, it is natural to 
think about the person’s options and his or her ranking of alternatives. In this case, 
one asks questions of the form, “What should he or she do?” But when we attribute 
agency to a group of people then the focus can shift to the profiles which the group 
can enact, and to the group’s ranking of the outcomes. Then the question of interest 
might change to, “What should they do?” Note that this latter question exemplifies the 
first step of a director’s reasoning. Bacharach’s core intuition is that as the focus shifts 
from the options that an individual can choose to the profiles which groups can 
implement, the answers to these should-do questions change from being indeterminate 
(as in the equilibrium selection problem) to determinate. 
 
Suppose that instead of simply attributing agency to a group from the outside (i.e., the 
case of the director), members of the group come to self-identify with the team. In this 
case, the relevant question changes from, “What should they do?” to, “What should 
we do?” Bacharach argues that when people start to ask these questions they undergo 
a two-part transformation: they not only experience a payoff transformation (seeking 
to promote U rather than ui) but also an agency transformation - each person thinks of 
herself as a component part of the team’s agency. Then just as the director engages in 
the first step of director reasoning so the team member engages in the first step of 
team reasoning, identifying the profile that maximises U. 
 
 
Bacharach argues that the likelihood of group identification is a function of a range of 
factors, some of which may be identifiable characteristics of a strategic interaction. 
One such characteristic is strong interdependence: each player realises that she will 
do well from framing her decision in terms of team agency only to the extent that she 
can be assured that her similarly motivated partner takes a particular action, and there 
is uncertainty as to whether the partner will take the action in question. In 
coordination games, PDs, and Hi-Lo games, solving for equilibria of the interactions 
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among players optimizing their individual preferences does not provide such 
assurance.  
 
Bacharach refines this notion of strong interdependence to define the interdependence 
hypothesis. Consider the profiles S and S*, where S is a solution to the game when 
players reason individualistically (e.g., (Defect, Defect) in a PD) and S* is optimal for 
the group (e.g., (Cooperate, Cooperate) in a PD). Strong interdependence implies that, 
given S and S*, the players have common interest in, and copower for, S* over S, 
while recognising that S is a solution to the game that will obtain if the players reason 
individualistically. The interdependence hypothesis is that group identification is 
stimulated by perception of strong interdependence.  
 
Bacharach then argues that the salience of strong interdependence, the lack of 
countervailing pressures to self-identify, and the degree of strong interdependence, 
are likely to affect the tendency to group identify, as implied by the interdependence 
hypothesis. Finally, he argues that when endogenous group identification occurs, the 
shared payoff function U will respect unanimity: if ui and uj, i ≠ j, share the same 
ranking of profiles, then U will embody this ranking. 
 
We are now in a position to state Bacharach’s proposed resolution of the selection 
problem that seems to leave the game theorist unable to apply the Hi-Lo game 
analysis reasonably to applications with human players. In strategic interactions that 
fit the Hi-Lo specification, strong interdependence is highly salient and the payoff 
assignment indicates that there are no countervailing pressures to self-identify. As the 
players’ preferences are in perfect alignment, ui and uj will share the same ranking of 
profiles and, by unanimity, the group payoff function U will embody this ranking. 
Consequently, the tendency for players to group identify will be strong, and, if this 
occurs, it sets in motion the process whereby players team reason, identify (High, 
High) as the best profile, and then implement the action that falls to them as part of 
the optimal profile, i.e., play High. 
 
Bacharach argues that this theory has a far wider scope than coordination games. 
Specifically, strategic interactions, such as Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes and PD, 
which embody mixed motives, are likely to prime group identification and prompt 
team reasoning. However, these games differ in important ways from coordination 
games. In mixed motive games, there are countervailing pressures to self-identify, 
which, therefore, imply reduction in the salience of strong interdependence. 
Consequently, one expects team reasoning and attainment of the optimal profile for 
the team to be less prevalent in these interactions than in coordination games. People 
might waver between the gestalts of self-identification and team-identification. 
 
In mixed motive games the link between the group payoff function U and the 
individual payoff functions ui and uj is more complex than in games where players’ 
utilities are perfectly aligned. Bacharach argues that when endogenous group 
identification primes team reasoning the shared payoff function U will respect 
unanimity in ui and uj and symmetry between individual payoffs. That is, in the PD 
example below, we only need to specify uF to account for the strategy profile when 
one player cooperates and the other defects, rather than use two variables to index the 




Consider Table IV below, which represents a generic PD, where C stands for 
Cooperate and D stands for Defect. The following inequalities must hold for the game 
to be dominance-solvable: a > b > c > d. In addition, for (C, C) to be Pareto optimal, b 
> [(a + d) / 2]. Now suppose that we want to find mechanisms which maximise U, 
where U is defined as a sum of agents’ payoffs, and assume that anyone in the 
remainder plays D as her default choice. Assume further that the players interact in an 
unreliable coordination context and will engage, therefore, in circumspect team 
reasoning. 
 
The first-best profile o* is (C, C) and if ω = 1, this profile will be enacted. But if ω < 
1 then matters are more complicated. Let uC = 2b represent the sum of individual 
payoffs when both players cooperate, uD = 2c represent the sum of individual payoffs 
if both players defect, and uF = a + d represent the sum of individual payoffs if one 
player cooperates while the other player defects; the subscript F refers to free-riding. 
Given the inequalities above, uC > uD and uC > uF.  
 
  Player 2 
  C D 
Player 1 C b, b d, a D a, d c, c 
Table IV 
 
Now consider the profile (C, C). With probability ω2 both players will adopt the 
profile and uC will result; with probability 2ω(1 – ω) one player will play C while the 
other plays D and uF will result; and with probability (1 – ω)2 both players will play D 
and uD will result. Thus, the expected value of U for the profile (C, C) is EU(C, C) = 
ω2uC + 2ω(1 – ω)uF + (1 – ω)2uD. 
 
Now consider the profile (D, D). As D is the default choice of both players, they will 
adopt the (D, D) profile with certainty and uD will result. Finally, consider the two 
profiles (C, D) and (D, C). As one of the players is always playing D, the expected 
value of U from these profiles is: ωuF + (1 – ω)uD. 
 
To determine o**, the profile which maximises U in an unreliable coordination 
context, we must consider two cases. The first is where uF ≥ uD. In this case, EU(C, 
C) = ω2uC + 2ω(1 – ω)uF + (1 – ω)2uD > ωuF + (1 – ω)uD = EU(C, D) = EU(D, C) for 
all values of ω and (C, C) therefore defines the profile o**. 
 
The second case is where uD > uF. In this situation, the optimal profile o** depends on 
the value of ω. To see this, normalise uC = 1 and uD = 0 and note that uF < 0. Then, 
EU(C, C) =  ω2 + 2ω(1 – ω)uF > 0 = EU(D, D) ⟺	  ω > [2uF / (2uF – 1)]. The reverse 
holds if ω < [2uF / (2uF – 1)]. In words, at high values of ω (that is, when the 
likelihood that agents function under M is high) the optimal profile o** is (C, C) but 
when the value of ω is low, the optimal profile o** is (D, D). Thus, the PD can be 
averted when the probability that agents team reason is relatively high.  
 
In summary, Bacharach’s theory structures models in which individuals may undergo 
payoff and agency transformations when strategic interactions are characterised by 
strong interdependence. Such interdependence prompts group identification and team 
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reasoning, which together entail identifying the optimal profile and then reasoning to 
the conclusion that each player should adopt her component of the optimal profile. 
 
Bacharach’s project reflects the assumption that to explain the outcome of an 
interaction by identifying it with the equilibrium of a game requires specifying a path 
of reasoning that would select the outcome in question. This leaves open the 
possibility that people sometimes reach the outcomes that team reasoners would by 
other means – say, emotional identification with symbols of fused agency. In such 
instances Bacharach’s account encourages the judgment that game theory has nothing 
to contribute to the explanation. The agents in this kind of case don’t decide that it is 
best to reason as a team, but simply do fuse their agency; if they participate in any 
processes usefully modelled as games, these will be interactions of their team with 
other agents (including, perhaps, other teams).  
 
Following Coleman (1990), Ross (2014) argues for wider applicability of game 
theory. The mathematics of games is the basis for more than models of rational choice 
based on deliberation; it is also a technology for modelling social group formation and 
maintenance. Evolutionary game theory is one widespread approach to this project, 
but it abstracts from the context of choice altogether; individuals in evolutionary 
games simply express strategies selected by fitness competitions. If people can in fact 
switch between individually framed and team framed agency in the course of their 
strategic interactions, as Bacharach suggests and as observation supports, then it is 
natural to ask whether game theory can contribute anything to our understanding of 
this. If in fact it can, then a second question arises: might the strategic principles that 
govern team framing itself also help to explain the relative stability of the equilibria at 
which teams arrive?  
 
The issue at hand transcends questions about the reach of game theory. Bacharach 
defends a deontological interpretation of team reasoning as a driver of behaviour. 
Once an individual has identified the optimal team profile and her component in it, he 
insists, she is rationally obliged to execute her component. Bacharach refers to this as 
the projection feature of profile-based reasoning, arguing that, “The underlying 
general principle is that I cannot coherently will something without willing what I 
know to be logically entailed by it” (2006, p. 136). It seems plausible that people 
sometimes reason in this way. However, we are sceptical of a claim to the effect that 
when people identify with teams and choose actions accordingly, they typically do so 
by means of reasoning or are much influenced by ‘logical compulsion’. Game theory, 
like economics, is concerned with choices. If choice is defined in terms of outputs of 
reasoning processes, it follows that an account of team agency must be an account of 
reasoning. It might not necessarily be an account of actual deliberation in which 
people consciously engage, but rather an ex post rationalization of behaviour that 
serves as a ‘stand-by’ or ‘back-up’ to more common behaviour-generating processes, 
as per the account of Pettit (2001). However, in our view a general theory of an aspect 
of agency, particularly economic agency, should reflect the more deflationary account 
of choice that, as argued by Ross (2011), partly distinguishes economics from 
psychology, both methodologically and in terms of explanatory domains. According 
to this deflationary view, a behaviour is chosen just in case it is subject to influence 
by incentives, regardless of whether the causal channel that links incentives and 
behaviour involves deliberation. For example, if people spontaneously copy the 
behaviour of higher-status, kin-bonded, or apparently successful people without 
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thinking, this behaviour can still be regarded as chosen because counter-incentives 
could dampen it, even though by hypothesis it does not result from reasoning. 
 
An empirical basis for doubting that team reasoning is the only, or even principal, 
basis for team agency among people is drawn from developmental psychology. In 
efforts to shed light on the evolutionary depth of human altruism, researchers have 
compared spontaneous prosocial behaviour in human and chimpanzee infants 
(Warneken and Tomasello 2006, 2007, 2009a, 2009b). Much of the focus has been on 
sharing, which does not necessarily implicate team agency. However, one of the 
primary alleged sites of difference between young humans and young chimpanzees 
has been based on observations of spontaneous assistance provided to adults who 
feign difficulty in completing tasks. The claim that young chimpanzees do not do this 
has been called into question (Horner et al 2011); but that humans as young as 14 
months join the projects of others without direct inducement by contingent reward is 
well established. This is at least prima facie evidence that team agency in humans is a 
natural propensity, rather than behaviour that depends on deliberate reasoning. If 
young chimpanzees in fact show the same proclivity, at least under certain conditions, 
this would provide further grounds for seeking a more general theory.  
 
Thus there are both theoretical and empirical motivations for seeking a more general 
game-theoretic account of team agency. A theory of team reasoning would then be a 
special application of this more general theory that could augment the relative 
stability of team solutions in groups of agents who are overwhelmingly motivated by 
rational deliberation. Wynn Stirling (2012)5  has recently provided a formal theory 
that Ross (2014, Chapter 5) conjectured as filling just this role. In the next section, we 
first summarise Stirling’s construction, and then confirm Ross’s conjecture. 
 
3. Conditional game theory and social agency 
 
The avowed aim of Stirling (2012) is to develop a concept of group preference, which 
is not simply an exogenous aggregation of individual preferences, but which arises 
endogenously as social influences propagate through a group. Stirling’s framework is 
a strict generalisation of orthodox, non-evolutionary game theory that incorporates the 
influence of social bonds through the technology of conditional preferences. 
 
To illustrate the intuition we employ an example due to Ross (2014). Consider a 
Board of Directors that must decide whether to engage in a risky hostile takeover bid. 
There are at least two ways in which the views of the Board can be elicited. Under 
process (i), the Chair sends out a detailed risk analysis of the costs and benefits of the 
proposed takeover prior to the board meeting. Under process (ii), the Chair, citing 
security concerns, presents the same information to the Board but only after they have 
assembled in the boardroom. The question of interest is whether these two processes 
should be expected to yield the same outcome.  
 
Process (i) encourages the Board members to form unconditional preferences prior to 
the meeting, which they might then defend against other members’ arguments. 
Process (ii), by contrast, may induce members to monitor one another while they 
                                                
5 See also Stirling and Felin (2013). 
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decide which option is best and may lead them to modulate their preferences on the 
basis of the preferences of others. Under both processes, differing individual 
preferences are likely to be expressed through non-unanimous votes. But the 
distribution of these preferences might vary across the two scenarios because process 
(ii) encourages revelation of preferences that are influenced by information about the 
preferences of others, which thereby affords more opportunity for preference 
calibration.  
 
The starting point of Stirling’s analysis is the distinction between what he terms 
categorical and conditional preferences. Categorical preferences unconditionally 
define an agent’s ranking of all possible outcomes, regardless of other agents’ 
preferences, whereas conditional preferences are based on influence flows which 
propagate through a group and define agents’ rankings of alternative outcomes as 
conditional on the preferences of others. This propagation of influence flows, which 
is modelled using graph theory, defines a social model that enables agents to jointly 
consider individual and group interests, as in Bacharach’s framework, but without 
requiring us to leave the Nash constraint. 
 
Building on the earlier example, but simplifying to the case of the Chair and one 
Board member, assume that each player has two actions6: support (S) the takeover bid 
or do not support (NS) the takeover bid. Thus, the outcome space for this game is: (S, 
S), (S, NS), (NS, S), (NS, NS), where the Chair’s action is listed first and the Board 
member’s action is listed second. Assume further that the Chair has categorical 
preferences over the action profiles but, as suggested earlier, the board member’s 
preferences may be influenced by the Chair’s. Specifically, suppose that if (S, S) is 
the Chair’s optimal profile, the board member will define his ranking of the 
alternatives on the basis of this hypothesis. By contrast, if (NS, NS) is the Chair’s 
optimal profile then the board member may define a different preference ordering. 
Given the four possible outcomes of this game, the Board member can define 
different preference orderings which are conditional on his conjecture concerning the 
preference ordering of the Chair. 
 
Stirling’s intuition is that as social influence propagates through a group and players 
modulate their preferences on the basis of other players’ preferences, a complex 
notion of group preference may emerge. This notion may not directly provide the 
basis for action, but rather serve as a social model which incorporates all of the 
relationships and interdependencies that exist among the agents. Stirling refers to this 
concept as concordance and it captures the extent to which a conjectured7 set of 
(categorical or conditional) preferences yield controversy within a group. Crucially, 
                                                
6 Actions properly refer to the alternatives available to a player at an information set in the extensive 
form of a game, whereas a strategy is a complete plan of action, specifying the move that a player will 
make at each information set where he or she may be called upon to act. Stirling confines his attention 
to finite strategic form games and employs the term ‘action’ interchangeably with ‘strategy.’ Despite 
some discomfort with this louche talk, we will follow his usage here. 
7 The notion of a conjecture is familiar from Bayesian games, where each player is assigned a 
distribution of expectations over the elements of other players’ strategy sets. In Stirling’s framework, 
this idea is generalized so that a conjecture is a belief about the strategy profile that will be instantiated 
by all players, including the player to whom the conjecture is assigned. As will become clear, it is the 
recursive nature of equilibrium determination in conditional game theory that allows for this. 
-13- 
 
concordance does not refer to the goals of a group nor to the goals of the individuals 
who comprise it, but rather to the level of discord that hypothetical propositions 
concerning players’ preferences engender among members of the group. 
 
For example, consider the following joint conjectures for the Chair and Board 
member: a1 = {(S, S), (S, NS)} and a2 = {(S, S), (NS, NS)}. Assume that under a1, the 
Chair’s conjecture (S, S) is best for her and next-best for the Board member while the 
Board member’s conjecture (S, NS) is best for him but next-best for the Chair. By 
contrast, assume that under a2, the Chair’s conjecture (S, S) is, once again, best for 
her and next-best for the board member while the Board member’s conjecture (NS, 
NS) is worst for both players. Which conjecture is likely to entail a greater level of 
controversy among the players? The joint conjecture a1 involves different conjectures 
by the two players but they do not include the players’ worst outcome. The joint 
conjecture a2, by contrast, incorporates a conjecture (S, S) that might be satisfactory 
to either player but one (NS, NS) which is the worst for both players. Consequently, 
we might expect a2 to produce more severe dispute among the players than a1 and an 
ordering over these joint conjectures that is sensitive to these varying levels of 
controversy encodes the concept of concordance. 
 
The level of concordance varies with the specific strategic interaction under study. In 
games where players’ interests are perfectly aligned, the extent of controversy will be 
minimised when players conjecture identical action profiles. In zero-sum games, by 
contrast, a low degree of controversy is more likely when conjectures are 
diametrically opposed. In a penalty shootout in soccer, for example, success for the 
group (i.e., the two teams together) requires fierce competition and rivalry so if the 
goalkeeper were to favour a conjecture similar to the striker this would undermine 
competition and produce a high level of controversy. As Stirling (2012, p. 40) notes, 
“… even antagonists can behave concordantly.” 
 
While the concept of concordance may provide the basis for an emergent notion of 
group preference its value derives from the extent to which it is determined by the 
individuals who make up a group. In other words, concordance should not be imposed 
exogenously on a group from the outside but should instead be determined by the 
social linkages and influence flows among members of a group. Stirling refers to this 
principle as endogeny. It is among the building blocks of his aggregation theorem, 
which in turn provides a model of the social relationships and interdependencies of 
members of a group, and a device for simultaneously representing individual and 
group agency. 
 
To develop a concordant ordering which respects the principles of conditioning (i.e., 
that players’ preferences may be conditional on the preferences of others) and 
endogeny, Stirling employs the logic of multivariate probability theory in a 
praxeological context. He urges us to understand praxeology on the basis of an 
analogy with epistemology. Whereas epistemology is concerned with the nature and 
scope of knowledge and classifies propositions on the basis of their veracity, 
praxeology classifies propositions on the basis of their efficacy and efficiency.  
 
In probability theory, given a set of two discrete random variables {X, Y}, the 
conditional probability mass function pY|X (y | x) = P(Y = y | X = x) is a measure of the 
likelihood that the random variable Y = y given that, or conditional on, the random 
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variable X = x. This conditional probability mass function is defined as the ratio of the 
joint probability of X and Y and the marginal probability of X or pY|X (y | x) = pX Y (x, y) 
/ pX (x). Solving this expression for pX Y (x, y) as the subject of the formula (i.e., pX Y (x, 
y) = pY|X (y | x) × pX (x)) it is clear that the joint probability of X and Y can be derived 
from the conditional probability of Y given X and the marginal probability of X. In 
other words, probability theory provides a framework for combining information from 
different sources – in this instance, the conditional probability of Y given X and the 
marginal probability of X – to determine the joint likelihood of an event. 
 
In the praxeological framework, Stirling’s goal is to derive a concordant ordering for 
the group which combines the conditional and categorical preferences of members of 
the group, in much the same way as the joint probability of an event is determined by 
conditional and marginal probabilities. Working directly with preference orderings 
quickly becomes cumbersome, so Stirling seeks to derive utility functions that 
represent the players’ categorical and conditional preferences and the group’s 
concordant preference ordering. The existence theorem for a utility function that 
represents categorical preferences is well known so we will focus on the derivation of 
a conditional utility function and the principles which must hold so as to permit 
aggregation of categorical and conditional preferences to derive a concordant utility 
function. 
 
Let {X1, …, Xn}, n ≥ 2, represent a set of n players, and let Ai denote a finite set of 
actions available to player i from which he or she must choose one element to 
instantiate. An action or strategy profile is an array a = (a1, …, an) ∈ A1 × … × An. 
Under classical game theory, players have categorical utility or payoff functions 
defined over strategy profiles: ui : A1 × … × An → R.  
 
In the context of conditional preferences it is useful to define the parent set pa(Xi) = 
{Xi1, …, Xin} as the ni-element subset of players whose preferences influence Xi’s 
preferences. Assume that Xij, the jth parent of Xi, forms the hypothetical proposition 
that profile aij will occur. This hypothetical proposition is termed a conjecture. Thus, 
let ai = {ai1, …, ain} represent the joint conjecture of pa(Xi). Then there exists a 
function which maps action profiles, conditional on the joint conjecture of pa(Xi), to 
the real line R, which represents Xi’s preferences: uXi | pa(Xi)(· | ai) : A1 × … × An → R. 
Note that if pa(Xi) = ∅, then the conditional utility uXi | pa(Xi) becomes the categorical 
utility ui. Given the existence of a conditional utility function which represents 
players’ conditional preferences, the collection {Xi, Ai, uXi | pa(Xi), i = 1, …, n} 
constitutes a finite, normal form, noncooperative conditional game. 
 
Returning to our example of the Chair (C) and the Board member (B), the conditional 
game consists of two players {XC, XB}, each with two actions Ai = {S, NS}, and the 
utility functions uC (aC) and uB|C (aB | aC), for the Chair and Board member, 
respectively. 
 
Note that through appropriate normalisation one can ensure that all utilities (i.e., 
categorical and conditional) are non-negative and sum to unity, which implies that the 
utilities have all of the characteristics of probability mass functions. As discussed 
earlier, in an epistemological framework marginal and conditional probabilities can be 
combined to determine a joint probability: pX Y (x, y) = pY|X (y | x) × pX (x). 
Consequently, if the praxeology-epistemology analogy is appropriate, it may be 
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possible to aggregate the conditional and categorical utilities to define a group utility 
function that incorporates the social linkages and interdependencies of members of a 
group and thereby represents the level of concordance of the group. The benefit of 
showing that this praxeology-epistemology analogy holds is that it will then be 
possible to apply concepts from multivariate probability theory, such as Bayes’s rule 
and marginalisation, in a praxeological context and derive game-theoretic solution 
concepts that incorporate both individual and group interests. 
 
Returning to our example, the goal is to combine the categorical preferences of the 
Chair with the conditional preferences of the Board member to produce an emergent 
preference ordering for the group. The requirement is to prove that the group or 
concordant utility UCB (aC, aB) = uB|C (aB | aC) × uC (aC). In words, the concordant 
utility U is the product of the board member’s conditional utility and the Chair’s 
categorical utility.  
 
In assembling the basis for such a proof, Stirling adopts three further assumptions or 
principles. The first is acyclicity, which means that no cycles can occur in the social 
influence relationships among players. In other words, if the Chair influences the 
Board member, then the Board member cannot influence the Chair. The problem with 
cyclical influence relationships is that they raise the possibility of indirect self-
influence: the Chair influences the Board member, who in turn influences the Chair, 
which leads to a non-terminating cycle. Clearly this limits the generality of the model, 
and in so doing raises the stakes on its capacity to generalise the idea of team agency. 
As we shall see below, however, the restrictive power of acyclicity is countered 
elsewhere in the theory. An implication of acyclicity is that influence relationships are 
hierarchical and that at least one player in a strategic interaction must possess 
categorical preferences. Another implication is that social influence relationships can 
be represented using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). 
 
The second principle is exchangeability, which Stirling and Felin (2013) refer to as 
framing invariance. This principle requires that if a strategic interaction can be framed 
in different ways but there is no loss of information under the different framings, then 
all framings must produce an identical concordant ordering. What this principle 
implies is that players must be willing to take into consideration the preferences of 
others when defining their own preferences, even if only to a small degree, and that 
the same information is available to the players under alternative framings.  
 
In an epistemological context, framing invariance is a natural restriction because it 
implies that pX Y (x, y) = pY|X (y | x) × pX (x) = pY (y) × pX|Y (x | y) = pY X (y, x). For 
framing invariance to hold in a praxeological context, the concordant utility must 
satisfy the following conditions: UCB (aC, aB) = uB|C (aB | aC) × uC (aC) = uB (aB) × uC|B 
(aC | aB) = UBC (aB, aC). In words, the concordant utility UCB, which combines the 
conditional preferences of the Board member and categorical preferences of the 
Chair, must be the same as the concordant utility UBC, which combines the categorical 
preferences of the Board member and the conditional preferences of the Chair. This 
principle mitigates the restrictive force of acyclicity with respect to the range of 
interactions we can use the theory to model.  
 
The final principle required to derive a concordant utility function that has all of the 
characteristics of a joint probability mass function is monotonicity. This is a natural 
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restriction on the concordant utility function, which ensures that no individual’s 
preferences will be arbitrarily subjugated by the group. Specifically, if an individual 
or subgroup prefers option A to B and the other players are indifferent among them, 
then the group must not prefer B to A. Thus, if the Chair prefers S to NS and the 
Board member is indifferent, the group must not prefer NS to S. 
 
Stirling (2012, p. 59 – 60) proves that if the principles of conditioning, endogeny, 
acyclicity, exchangeability and monotonicity hold, then a concordant utility function 
exists that represents the social relationships of the group, and is derived from the 
conditional and categorical utility functions of its members. The most general form of 
the concordant utility function is: 
 
UX1…Xn (a1, …, an) = Πni = 1 uXi | pa(Xi)(ai | ai) 
 
This expression shows that the concordant utility function, which combines 
information in a praxeological domain, shares exactly the same syntax as a joint 
probability mass function that combines information in an epistemological domain. 
Consequently, the full power of multivariate probability theory (particularly Bayes’ 
rule and marginalisation) can be applied in a praxeological context to determine 
effective and efficient action when social influences propagate through a group. 
 
Marginalisation is an important operation in the praxeological domain because it 
allows the analyst to extract players’ ex post preferences once social influence has 
permeated the group. A player’s ex post unconditional preferences are extracted in the 
following manner: 
 
uXi (ai) = Σ~ai UX1…Xn (a1, …, an), 
 
where Σ~ai means that the sum is taken over all arguments except ai. Note that these ex 
post categorical utilities represent the players’ preferences after taking into account 
the social relationships and interdependencies that exist in the group. As the 
preferences are unconditional, standard solution concepts such as dominance and NE 
can be applied to them. 
 
The preceding discussion is summarised in Figure I. As social influences propagate 
through a group, players define their conditional preferences. Through the process of 
aggregation these social linkages and interdependencies lead to an emergent notion of 
group preference: concordance. Finally, through the process of marginalisation, the 





Figure I: Conditioning, Aggregation and Extraction 
 
     Source: Stirling (2012, p. 19) 
 
Acyclicity implies that social influence relationships in conditional games can be 
modelled using a DAG. A DAG is a graph made up of vertices or nodes, which in a 
praxeological context represents the players, and directed edges or links, which 
capture the influence relationships between the players. If one player, C, influences 
another player, B, we write C → B, where C is referred to as the parent of B and B as 
the child of C. The set of parents of B is denoted pa(B) and the set of children of B is 
denoted ch(B). If a vertex has no parents pa(C) = ∅ then it is called a root vertex. 
Figure II shows the DAG for the Chair and board member example and the case 
where there is a Chair and two Board members. 
 
In the two-player DAG, the Chair influences the Board member but, given acyclicity, 
the board member does not influence the Chair. The Board member’s conditional 
utility uB|C is represented by the edge between the nodes C and B. In the three-player 
DAG, the Chair influences Board member B1 and Board member B2, and Board 
member B1 influences Board member B2. The influence flow between C and B1 is 
captured by the conditional utility uB1|C and the influence flows between C and B1 
toward B2 are captured by the conditional utility uB2|B1C. The associated concordant 
utility for the three-player DAG is:  
 
UCB1B2 (c, b1, b2) = uC(c) × uB1|C(b1, c) × uB2|B1C(b2 | c, b1) 
 
This expression combines information from the categorical and conditional utilities to 
define the concordant utility in much the same way that a Bayesian network, which 
can also be represented in a DAG, combines information from marginal and 
conditional probabilities to determine a joint probability. Thus, a DAG provides a 
graphical method to represent the influence flows, and associated conditional utilities, 





Figure II: Directed Acyclic Graphs 
 
 
The three-player DAG in Figure II shows that B2 does not directly influence B1 and 
that neither B1 nor B2 directly influence C. However, this does not imply that B1 and 
B2 have no influence on C whatsoever. Recall that the exchangeability constraint 
means that a social model should be invariant to the way in which the information 
about linkages and influence flows is aggregated. This implies that once the 
concordant utility has been defined, we can apply Bayes’s rule to extract reciprocal 
influence relationships. Specifically, suppose that B1 conjectures b1 and we want to 
determine the influence of this conjecture on the Chair’s preference for c: uC|B1(c | b1). 
The answer follows directly from Bayes’ rule: 
 
uC|B1(c | b1) = [uB1|C(b1 | c) × uC(c)] / uB1(b1), 
 
where uB1(b1) is derived by marginalising the concordant utility.  
 
We can also determine the influence that B1 and B2 exert on C and the influence that 
B2 exerts on B1 by computing the appropriate conditional and categorical utilities 
using Bayes’s rule and marginalisation. The crucial idea here is that once the 
concordant utility has been defined, exchangeability implies that many hierarchical 
structures are compatible with the social model of the group. In other words, the 
social model is framing invariant. 
 
Stirling then extends – as opposed to refines – the standard solution concepts of 
dominance and NE, to apply over group-level preference orderings. His approach is to 
extract a marginal utility for the group in much the same way as a marginal utility for 
each player was extracted from the concordant utility. A crucial assumption behind 
the procedure is that, given that players can only control their own actions, each 
player will make conjectures over her own action sets and not those of other players. 
 
Thus, let aij denote the jth element of ai, where ai is Xi’s conjecture profile. Now form 
the action profile (a11, …, ann) by taking the ith element of each Xi’s conjecture profile. 
Finally, sum the concordant utility over all elements of each ai except aii to form the 




VX1… Xn (a11, …, ann) = Σ~a11 … Σ~ann UX1…Xn (a1, …, an) 
 
As Stirling notes, the group does not act as a single entity and it cannot, therefore, 
instantiate its own preferred alternative, but the group utility provides a metric by 
which individual players determine the impact of their choices on the group. In much 
the same way as players can extract their marginal utilities from the concordant utility 
function, they can extract their own individual marginal welfare functions from the 
group utility. Specifically, the marginal individual welfare function vXi of Xi is the ith 
marginal of VX1… Xn: 
 
vXi (ai) = Σ~ai VX1…Xn (a1, …, an) 
 
The existence of group and individual welfare functions allows Stirling to derive a 
solution concept that allows us to formally integrate consideration of the interests of 
the group with consideration of the interests of the individual players. This solution 
concept relies on the maximum individual and group welfare solutions.  
 
The maximum group welfare solution is: 
 
a* = arg max a ∈ A1 × … × An VX1… Xn (a) 
 
The maximum individual welfare solution is: 
 
ai§ = arg max ai ∈	 Ai vXi (ai) 
 
If ai§ = ai* for all i ∈ {1, …, n}, the action profile is a consensus choice, meaning that 
group and individual welfare is maximised when a is instantiated. As Stirling notes, a 
consensus choice will often not exist, in which case players might be motivated to 
enter into negotation to reach compromise. In a noncooperative game setting, the 
outcomes of such negotiations would need to be protected by commitment devices. 
This would signal a failure of team agency to form, though repeated interaction with 
the resulting new institutions might ultimately incentivise players to identify with 
them, and thereby create conditions for team agency later. For present purposes, 
however, it suffices to show that conditional game theory generalises team agency in 
cases where consensus choice applies, because Bacharach’s unanimity condition is a 
special case of it. 
 
To show this, we begin with the PD. As Bacharach recognises, one cannot obtain 
cooperation in a PD – in his framework, the conditions for team reasoning are not 
present – if no player cares about the welfare of the group at all. Thus, as established 
by Binmore (1994), if the preference structure of the PD describes all of the relevant 
preference information pertinent to the interaction, then general defection is the only 
outcome that a game theoretic model of it can predict. Binmore further insists that if 
the model does not incorporate all such information in the specification of 
preferences, then the game should not be characterised as a PD in the first place. 
However, admitting the mere possibility of team agency allows us to admit that more 
than one game structure might be relevant to modeling an empirical interaction. This 
situation is hardly unprecedented in economics. We are used to the idea, for example, 
that a plurality of models are useful for foregrounding different aspects of 
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international trade, oligopoly, national production, and other phenomena. Stirling 
(2012, p. 80) draws a distinction between simple reciprocal altruism that transforms 
PDs into coordination games, and background representations of interaction structures 
in which players’ models of their own and others’ preferences are consistent with the 
PD structure but they are also aware of preferences they would have conditional on 
the implementation of some degree of socially mediated agency. This is indeed the 
basis on which Stirling’s general framework is given its name.  
 
The machinery by which Stirling represents genuine PD structure simultaneously with 
scope for team agency representation are cooperation and exploitation indices. 
Specifically, Stirling endows each player Xi with a cooperation index αi ∈ [0, 1] and 
an exploitation index βi ∈ [0, 1], where αi represents the extent to which a player is 
conditionally willing to cooperate, and βi represents the extent to which a player is 
conditionally willing to exploit his or her partner. Because these tolerances are 
conditional on the same model transformation, we impose a minimal consistency 
requirement by assuming that α + β < 1. To respect acyclicity, assume further that X1 
has categorical preferences and that X2’s conditional preferences are conditional on 
X1’s.  
 
Given the cooperation and exploitation indices, X1’s categorical utility is defined as 
follows: 
 uX1 (C, C) = α1 uX1 (C, D) = 0  
 uX1 (D, C) = β1 uX1 (D, D) = 1 – α1 – β1   
 
In the PD representation of the interaction, β1 > α1 > 1 – α1 – β1 > 0, and X2 has a 
categorical utility function such that uX2 (C, D) > uX2 (C, C) > uX2 (D, D) > uX2 (D, C).  
 
For the conditional representation, we calculate uX2|X1 (a21, a22 | a11, a12) by computing 
utilities for every possible conjecture that player X1 can make. Assume that if X1 
conjectures either (C, C) or (D, D) then X2 will place all of her conditional utility 
mass on the same action profile. In other words, if X1 conjectures cooperation then X2 
finds it optimal to cooperate but if X1 conjectures defection then X2 finds it optimal to 
defect. If X1 conjectures (C, D), then X2’s utility mass will be apportioned according 
to her cooperation and exploitation indices. Specifically, X2 will assign α2 to (C, C), β2 
to (C, D), 1 – α2 – β2 to (D, D) and zero utility mass to (D, C) because this is the worst 
possible outcome for X2. Finally, if X1 conjectures (D, C), the worst outcome for X2, 
X2 should place zero utility mass on (D, C), α2 and (C, C), β2 on (C, D) and 1 – α2 – β2 
on (D, D). The conditional utilities associated with each conjecture of X1, represented 
in the columns, and every action profile which can be instantiated by the two players, 
represented in the rows, are given in Table V. 
 
 (a11, a12) 
(a21, a22) (C, C) (C, D) (D, C) (D, D) 
(C, C) 1 α2 α2 0 
(C, D) 0 β2 β2 0 
(D, C) 0 0 0 0 





To compute the concordant utility we combine X1’s categorical utility with X2’s 
conditional utility: UX1X2 (a1, a2) = uX2|X1 (a21, a22 | a11, a12) × uX1 (a11, a12). The result is 
shown in Table VI where the rows index X1’s conjecture and the columns index X2’s 
conjecture. 
 
 (a21, a22) 
(a11, a12) (C, C) (C, D) (D, C) (D, D) 
(C, C) α1 0 0 0 
(C, D) 0 0 0 0 
(D, C) α2β1 β1β2 0 β1 – α2 β1 – β1β2  
(D, D) 0 0 0 1 – α1 – β1 
Table VI 
 
The concordant utility can now be used to extract the ex post marginal utilities, the 
group welfare function, and the individual welfare function. X1’s ex post utilities are 
equivalent to her categorical utilities, whereas X2’s ex post utilities must be derived 
through marginalisation: uX2 (a2) = Σ~a2 UX1X2 (a1, a2). For example, uX2 (C, C) = α1 + 0 
+ α2β1 + 0 = α1 + α2β1. The ex post payoff matrix for the PD is shown in Table VII. 
 
  X2 
  C D 
X1 
C α1, α1 + α2β1 0, β1β2 
D β1, 0 1 – α1 – β1, 1 – α1 – α2β1 – β1β2 
Table VII 
 
The group welfare function for this two-player game is derived using the following 
expression: VX1X2 (a11, a22) = Σ~a11 Σ~a22 UX1X2 (a1, a2). For example, VX1X2 (D, D) = β1β2 
+ 0 + β1 – α2 β1 – β1β2 + 1 – α1 – β1 = 1 – α1 – α2β1. The full group welfare function is: 
 
 VX1X2 (C, C) = α1  
 VX1X2 (C, D) = 0  
 VX1X2 (D, C) = α2β1  
 VX1X2 (D, D) = 1 – α1 – α2β1  
 
Finally, the individual welfare functions are extracted from the group welfare function 
using marginalisation: vXi (ai) = Σ~ai VX1X2 (a1, a2). For example, vX2 (C) = α1 + α2β1. 
Thus, the individual welfare functions are: 
 
 vX1 (C) = α1 vX1 (D) = 1 – α1  
 vX2 (C) = α1 + α2β1 vX2 (D) = 1 – α1 – α2β1  
 
To find the NE of this game after incorporating the social influence flows between X1 
and X2, we work directly with the conditional and categorical utilities (Stirling refers 
to the equilibria identified using this method as conditioned NE) or the ex post 
marginal utilities (Stirling refers to the equilibria identified using this method as ex 
post NE). The two approaches yield identical solutions. Table VII shows that (D, D) is 
a NE for all admissible values of αi and βi. Unlike the unconditional PD, (C, C) is a 
NE when αi > βi. Furthermore, when αi > βi, (C, C) is a consensus choice because it 
maximises both group and individual welfare. In an unconditional representation of 
the play that will in fact be observed, this would be reflected in altered payoff 
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rankings, making the empirically correct unconditional game an Assurance Game 
rather than a PD. 
 
It is intuitive that if both players prefer cooperation to exploitation then (C, C) will be 
a conditioned or ex post NE but this result fails to highlight the role that social 
influences can play in this game. To see this, assume that α1 = 0.6 and β1 = 0.3 and 
that α2 = 0.3 and β2 = 0.6. Thus, X1’s cooperation index is twice as large as her 
exploitation index but X2’s cooperation index is half as large as her exploitation index. 
So, in the absence of influence flows, X1 is a cooperator and X2 is an exploiter. But 
after X2 takes into account X1’s preferences, X2’s penchant for exploitation is 
tempered by X1’s desire for cooperation and (C, C) is a conditioned NE. 
 
While explaining cooperation in an empirical interaction that might be mis-predicted 
if we attend only to its unconditional model as a one-shot PD is an important  
accomplishment, we must keep in mind Bacharach’s argument that the litmus test for 
an effort to represent team agency is that it furnish an explanation for High play in Hi-
Lo. We now show that conditional game theory passes this test. In the discussion 
below, H stands for High and L stands for Low. 
 
To allow social influences to affect the analysis of Hi-Lo, we endow each player Xi 
with a High play index αi ∈ [0, 1] and a Low play index βi ∈ [0, 1], where αi + βi = 1, 
because the players will assign zero utility mass to mis-matches (i.e., (H, L) and (L, 
H)). Assume again that X1’s preferences are categorical and that X2’s conditional 
preferences are conditional on X1’s.  
 
Given the High play and Low play indices, X1’s categorical utility is defined as 
follows: 
 uX1 (H, H) = α1 uX1 (H, L) = 0  
 uX1 (L, H) = 0 uX1 (L, L) = β1   
 
To calculate uX2|X1 (a21, a22 | a11, a12) it is necessary to compute utilities for every 
possible conjecture of player X1. Assume that if X1 conjectures either (H, H) or (L, L) 
then X2 will place all of her conditional utility mass on the same action profile. That 
is, if X1 conjectures High then X2 finds it optimal to play High but if X1 conjectures 
Low then X2 finds it optimal to play Low. If X1 conjectures (H, L) or (L, H), then X2’s 
utility mass will be apportioned according to her High play and Low play indices. 
Specifically, X2 will assign α2 to (H, H) and β2 to (L, L), and zero utility mass to (H, 
L) and (L, H) because these are the worst outcomes for X2. The conditional utilities 
associated with each conjecture of X1, represented in the columns, and every action 
profile which can be instantiated by the two players, represented in the rows, are 
given in Table VIII. 
 
 (a11, a12) 
(a21, a22) (H, H) (H, L) (L, H) (L, L) 
(H, H) 1 α2 α2 0 
(H, L) 0 0 0 0 
(L, H) 0 0 0 0 





To compute the concordant utility we combine X1’s categorical utility with X2’s 
conditional utility: UX1X2 (a1, a2) = uX2|X1 (a21, a22 | a11, a12) × uX1 (a11, a12). The result is 
shown in Table IX where the rows index X1’s conjecture and the columns index X2’s 
conjecture. 
 
 (a21, a22) 
(a11, a12) (H, H) (H, L) (L, H) (L, L) 
(H, H) α1 0 0 0 
(H, L) 0 0 0 0 
(L, H) 0 0 0 0 
(L, L) 0 0 0 β1 
Table IX 
 
The concordant utility can now be used to extract the ex post marginal utilities, the 
group welfare function, and the individual welfare function. As X1’s preferences 
remain categorical, her ex post utilities are her categorical utilities whereas X2’s ex 
post utilities must be derived through marginalisation: uX2 (a2) = Σ~a2 UX1X2 (a1, a2). 
For example, uX2 (H, H) = α1 + 0 + 0 + 0 = α1. The ex post payoff matrix for Hi-Lo is 
shown in Table X. 
 
  X2 
  H L 
X1 
H α1, α1 0, 0 
L 0, 0 β1, β1 
Table X 
 
The group welfare function for this two-player game is derived using the following 
expression: VX1X2 (a11, a22) = Σ~a11 Σ~a22 UX1X2 (a1, a2). For example, VX1X2 (H, H) = α1 + 
0 + 0 + 0 = α1. The full group welfare function is: 
 
 VX1X2 (H, H) = α1  
 VX1X2 (H, L) = 0  
 VX1X2 (L, H) = 0  
 VX1X2 (L, L) = β1  
 
Finally, the individual welfare functions are extracted from the group welfare function 
using marginalisation: vXi (ai) = Σ~ai VX1X2 (a1, a2). For example, vX2 (H) = α1. Thus, the 
individual welfare functions are: 
 
 vX1 (H) = α1 vX1 (L) = β1  
 vX2 (H) = α1 vX2 (L) = β1  
 
To find the NE after incorporating the social influence flows between X1 and X2, we 
work directly with the conditional and categorical utilities to identify the conditioned 
NE, or with the ex post marginal utilities to identify the ex post NE. As desired, the 
two approaches yield identical solutions. Table X shows that (H, H) and (L, L) are NE 




When one focuses on the group and individual welfare functions we see that group 
and individual welfare is maximised through the profile (H, H) when α1 > β1. As this 
is the assumption in Hi-Lo, the profile that caters for the interests of the individuals 
and the group is (H, H) and this is a consensus choice. Consequently, we would 
expect this profile to be instantiated when players take into account their own 
individual interests and the interests of the group, as encoded in the social linkages 




Conditional game theory has full power to represent team agency using only 
resources that can be defined within standard game-theoretic formalism, and which 
can be represented using only standard solution concepts. It does not presuppose that 
players explicitly reason their way to solutions based on identification with teams, but 
it captures conditionalisation of games by that mechanism, among others. 
 
A conditional game-theoretic specification is also compatible with the hypothesis that 
people experience the sorts of gestalt switches between individual and team agency 
that Bacharach conjectures. Psychologists can contribute to our unified understanding 
of social behaviour by investigating the frequency of such switches, in both 
directions, in different sorts of circumstances, along with general kinds of conditions 
that encourage or interfere with them. It might be the case that, in most interactions, 
people either simply assume group-level agency and stick to it, or play their 
unconditioned best responses without reflection. (These tendencies might likely be 
both statistical and context dependent). It might even be typically best – because of 
the importance of stability of strategic expectations – if gestalt switches are relatively 
unusual.  
 
The strategic life of a social being is complicated, and one of the leading sources of 
this complication is multiple scales of agency. Game theory is up to the job of 
representing this multiplicity. The philosopher’s task of assessing it through its many 
normative angles and shadows is much less likely to find straightforward resolution, 
but can benefit from the existence of a general technical framework in which to 
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